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Abstract 
We explain why a firm with high quality benefits from a spinoff. We show that, in 
an asymmetric information framework, it is a market value maximizing strategy for 
a firm to spinoff its subsidiary when the value of the firm is a priori unknown to 
investors but can be discovered at a cost. This approach seems capable of shedding 
light on the motives behind spinoffs. In addition, we carry out an empirical study to 
examine whether Hong Kong spinoffs are associated with abnormal returns. We 
find that Hong Kong spinoffs cannot bring abnormal returns to investors but the 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review 
A number of studies have empirically analyzed the sources of shareholder gains 
around spinoffs (see Hite and Owers, 1983; Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Schipper and 
Smith, 1983; Seward and Walsh, 1996; Daley et al., 1997; Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999; Desai and Jain, 1999). The potential sources of gains from 
spinoffs analyzed in these studies may be classified as follows: (1) expropriation 
hypothesis, (2) tax avoidance hypothesis, (3) incentive alignment hypothesis, (4) 
corporate focus hypothesis and (5) information hypothesis. 
Several theoretical studies relating to spinoffs are grounded in the expropriation 
hypothesis. The expropriation hypothesis argues that during a spinoff, the assets and 
liabilities are restructured in a way that involves a transfer of wealth from the 
bondholders to the shareholders of the firm. 
Other studies, on the other hand, indicate that spin-offs may be motivated by tax 
avoidance. Schipper and Smith (1983) examine the tax and regulatory motives for 
spinoffs. They argue that a regulated firm might be able to spinoff a subsidiary in a 
way to escape the external regulations. A firm may also spinoff an overseas 
subsidiary to avoid paying U.S. taxes on the income from that division. Although the 
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benefits to individual firms from such motivations do exist, on average the tax 
avoidance hypothesis is not supported by evidence. 
The incentive alignment hypothesis states that performance of a firm might be 
improved due to improvement in the alignment of incentives between managers and 
shareholders. Aron (1991) develops a model in which corporate spinoffs are a feature 
of incentive contracts for managers in diversified firms. Managers in firms do not 
maximize the interests of the shareholders. Instead, they try to maximize their own 
interests. Therefore, a separation through a spinoff is optimal since managerial 
compensation based on the productivity and efficiency of individual divisions 
improves managers' incentives to increase firm value. Once the spinoff takes place, 
the stock value of the product line becomes a much clearer signal of managerial 
productivity than when the subsidiary belongs to the parent firm especially when the 
firm is sufficiently diversified. In addition, Seward and Walsh (1996) find that after a 
spinoff both the compensation committees and the boards of directors are comprised 
of a majority of outside directors, revealing the implementation of more efficient 
internal governance and control mechanisms. They also find that the compensation 
of the CEO of the spinoff becomes more dependent on performance. However, they 
find that the gains around spinoffs are not statistically related to these improvements 
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in contracting efficiency. 
According to the corporate focus hypothesis, managerial skills might be well suited 
to the management of core business but not to that of non-core assets. Consequently, 
allowing the managers to focus attention on the core business should improve 
corporate performance. Most discussion in the literature centers on the argument that 
focusing spinoffs are undertaken to increase operating efficiency. Hite and Owers 
(1983)，Schipper and Smith (1983)，Daley et al. (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) 
argue that spinoffs create value by removing unrelated businesses and freeing 
managers from operations unrelated to the core businesses and eliminate negative 
synergies between the parent and the subsidiary. Hite and Owers(1983) find that 
companies whose spinoffs were focus-increasing exhibit the largest abnormal returns 
during the 50 days prior to announcements to completion dates of the spinoffs. Desai 
and Jain (1999) find that the long-run abnormal returns for focus-increasing spinoffs 
are significantly larger than those for non-focus-increasing spinoffs. 
Meanwhile, the information hypothesis argues that spinoffs reduce information 
asymmetry in the market. A firm that is undervalued due to information asymmetry 
will experience an improvement in market valuation with the separation of its 
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divisions into independently traded units through a spinoff. Gilson et al. (1998) 
report that after spinoffs there is a significant increase in turnover among analysts 
who follow the firm's stocks. They also find that there is greater accuracy in 
analysts' earnings forecasts when there is higher turnover among analysts. As a result, 
if poor performance by one division has adversely affected the value of other more 
efficient and profitable divisions, a spinoff will eliminate the undervaluation. 
Krishnaswanmi and Subramaniam (1999) find that firms engaging in spinoffs have 
higher levels of information asymmetry. They also find that for the sample firms, 
information problems decrease significantly after the spinoff. Moreover, the gains 
around spinoffs are positively affected by the degree of information asymmetry. 
Firms with higher levels of information asymmetry exhibit higher abnormal returns. 
The main contribution of this study is that it is the first case study regarding 
abnormal returns of Hong Kong spinoffs. Although there is a broad consensus in 
both the academic setting and the popular literatures that spinoffs tend to create value 
for shareholders and exhibit positive long-run excess returns, all the previous studies 
are confined to the US and the European cases. We suggest that it is also a market 
value maximizing strategy for a firm to spinoff. Our results indicate that after 
spinoffs, the total market value of firms will increase. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter Two describes the framework 
and introduces the model. The empirical results are included in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Four reports the results of financial ratio analysis. The paper is concluded in 
Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Two: Spinoffs in an Asymmetric Framework 
The main goal of this chapter is to provide an additional potential explanation for the 
value creation by spinoffs in an asymmetric information framework. We borrow the 
model of Boot and Thakor (1993)^ to predict that it is a market value maximizing 
strategy for a firm to spinoff its subsidiary when its value is a priori unknown to 
investors but can be discovered at a cost. We will show that partitioning a firm into 
two separate divisions, one being "information sensitive" while the other being 
"information insensitive", makes informed trading more profitable. The reason is that 
informed traders with constrained wealth endowments earn a higher return on their 
investment in information by allocating their wealth to the information-sensitive 
division. The consequent stimulation of informed trading moves the equilibrium 
price of the intrinsically more valuable firm closer to its fundamental value and 
increases the high quality firm's total market value. One essential implication of our 
model is that only those firms with high quality will spinoff its subsidiary. Spinoffs 
are not optimal for firms with low quality. 
1 Boot and Thakor (1993) develop a noisy rational expectations model which explains why an issuer 
may wish to raise external capital by selling multiple financial claims that partition its total asset cash 
flows, rather than a single claim. They show that, in an asymmetric information environment, the 
issuer's expected revenue is enhanced by such cash flow partitioning because it makes informed trade 
more profitable. 
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A. The Model 
We consider a two-period model. At time t = 0, a firm issues a fixed number of 
common stocks. We normalize the supply of the shares to be 1 unit. The firm can be 
of two types: high quality (good) and low quality (bad). At t = 1, the values of the 
good (G) and bad (B) firms are ；c and x respectively, with 0 < x < x < o o . A t 
t = 0，the firm knows its own type but no one else knows a priori the firm's true type. 
The common known prior probability is p e (0,1) that the firm is of high quality 
and l - p that it is of low quality. There is no discounting between t = 0 and t = 1 
and there is universal risk neutrality. At t = 1, each firm's true value becomes 
common knowledge. 
There are two types of traders in the market: (1) uninformed traders whose demand is 
exogenous. (2) informed traders who are informed at a cost about the firm's intrinsic 
value and whose demands are endogenous.^ The aggregate asset demand, /, of the 
uninformed traders is a positive random variable. 
2 In the model of Boot and Thakor, there are three types of traders in the market: pure liquidity 
traders, uninformed discretionary traders and informed traders. 
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At t = 0, uninformed traders do not know the intrinsic value of the firm, but they can 
become informed by paying the information acquisition cost, W <X. They choose 
to remain uninformed because the information acquisition cost is larger than the 
expected benefit of the information acquired. Regarding the informed traders, they 
know precisely whether the firm is of high quality or low quality. We define DD as 
the aggregate demand from the informed traders. 
In addition, we assume that each potentially informed trader has W u n i t s of 
wealth, so that he has 1 unit of wealth to buy the shares after investing W in 
acquiring information. Upon investing W in information acquisition, the trader 
receives a signal r . We assume that this signal reveals the firm's precise value to 
him. An individual informed trader's demand is dd , where 
fl if T = G ,1� 
dd=ddiT) = \ : . � 
0 ij r = B 
An informed trader will buy the stock if and only if he discovers that the quality of 
the firm is good. 
Let (j) be the measure of the set of informed traders. Hence, the aggregate demand 
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from informed traders is 
DD =皿(於,T) = (/)dd(T). 
Moreover, each trader who becomes informed ends up investing W in information 
acquisition and 1 in purchasing the shares if his signal reveals t 二 G. The condition 
which determines (j) says that, for the marginal informed investors, the expected net 
gain from becoming informed is zero. Let V be an investor's expected net gain of 
being informed, P* the equilibrium price of the shares at t = 0, and P(T) the 
value of the shares privately known to the informed investor who receives signal r . 
As P * is determined by the demand of both informed and uninformed traders and 
uninformed traders do not know the true value of the firm, we assume that 
P(J = G) > P* > P{R 二 B), where P(T = G) = X and P(T = B) = X. 
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B. The Analysis 
Tvpe-G Firm 
Note that aggregate demand for the shares of the firm will be a function of I and 
DD，so that P* = P * {L,DD) • Since an informed trader will buy the stock when his 
signal reveals T = G, We can write 
V = -W + p[x-P''(/,DD)]/P*(/，DD)， (2) 
where we have substituted P(T = G)=又 and is the number of the 
units demanded. The equilibrium value of (j)，call it (j) *, is determined by the 
following marginal condition 
= (3) 
% 
With W being constant, (3) holds for marginal and inframarginal informed investors. 
Now, we can write (2) as 
V = -W + p[xlP''(/,DD) -1]. (4) 
Differentiating (4) with respect to DD gives us 
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dv / dDD = -pxP * ( / ,DD)-^ P (/,DD). 
It is clear that 产（!,£>!))> 0 is sufficient to ensure that dV/dDD<0. For a 
type-G firm, when an investor becomes informed, he will buy the stock and the price 
of the stock will then increase. Therefore, P*' (l,DD)>0 is always true for a 
type-G firm. 
Note that the total market value of the firm, R，can be written as 
R = P*(l’DD)(l + DD). (5) 
Differentiating (5) with respect to DD gives us 
dR/dDD =尸* (/,DD) + (/,DD)(l + DD) • (6) 




Using similar steps, we can show that dRIdDD < 0 for the type-B firm. Since an 
informed trader will take a short position for the stock when his signal reveals T = B, 
we can write 
V = -W + {\-p)[P'' (/，DD)-x]/P'' (/，DD) (7) 
where P(J = B) 二么 and [P*(L,DD)Y^ is the number of the units being sold. 
Then, rewrite (7) as 
厂二—炉+ (1— ； ( 8 ) 
Differentiating (8) with respect to DD gives us 
dV / dDD = (1 一 p)xP * (/,DD)-' P *' (/,DD). 
It is clear that P*' (l,DD) < OV/ is sufficient to ensure that dV I dDD < 0. For a 
type-B firm, when an investor becomes informed, he will take a short position for the 
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stock and the price of the stock will then decrease. Therefore, P*' (l,DD) <0 is 
always true for a type-B firm. 
Note that the total market value of the firm, R, can be written as 
R 二 P*iJ,DD)(l + DD). (5) 
Differentiating (5) with respect to DD gives us 
dR/dDD = P*(/ ,DD) + P*' (/,DD)(l + DD). (6) 
Apparently, for a type-B firm, given the sufficiency condition, P*' (l,DD) < 0, we 
have dR/dDD<Q. 
Thus, the total market value of the type-G firm, R, is increasing in the number of 
informed traders, DD. The type-B firm's R decreases when the number of informed 
traders, DD, increases. 
This analysis of the market equilibrium with the composite firm (without spinoffs) 
provides a benchmark for my subsequent examination of the gains from spinoffs. 
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Since the type-G issuer's expected market value is increasing in the total demand 
from informed traders, our analysis suggests that under the assumption of market 
value maximization, this firm should seek to restructure the firm in order to induce 
more traders to become informed. As it turns out, the firm can accomplish this by a 
spinoff. It will increase the "information sensitivity" of some divisions and induce 
corresponding informed trading. 
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C. Market Value Maximization^ 
Our objective in this section is to show that maintaining a combination of businesses 
is not market value maximizing for the type-G firm. A simple deconglomeration of 
the businesses can increase the firm's total market value. The diversified division of 
a firm is split up into two divisions: core business (C) which is not "information 
sensitive" and non-core business (N) which is more information sensitive than the 
composite b u s i n e s s . It is assumed that the payoff of holding the shares of C for 1 
period is x with probability one. Meanwhile, the payoff of holding the shares of N 
issued by type-G firm is x (probability p) and zero if the shares are issued by the 
type-B firm (probability 1-p). 
For type-G firms, we can show that splitting the composite business into core 
business and non-core business results in a higher expected equilibrium total market 
value. 
By separating a diversified firm into core and non-core divisions, the firm permits an 
3 One distinction between the model of Boot and Thakor (1993) and ours is in the objective of firms. 
The objective of firms in our model is to maximize the total market value of stocks but theirs is to 
maximize the total revenue. 
4 Boot and Thakor (1993) discuss the optimal design of security. They consider the composite 
security being split up into two securities: a senior security A which is not information sensitive and a 
junior security S which is more information sensitive than the composite security. 
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informed investor to invest all of his wealth in the more information sensitive stock 
N rather than being implicitly forced to invest some of it in C as in the case where he 
buys the composite shares. That is, at the margin, an informed trader has more to 
gain by being informed when he has the right to buy N than when he could only buy 
composite stocks. Consequently, an informed trader can be compensated for his 
information acquisition cost with a smaller divergence between the true value and the 
equilibrium price of N than the composite stocks. Since this divergence is what a 
type-G firm seeks to minimize and C is priced close to its true value because it is 
informationally insensitive and less information asymmetric, spinoff makes the 
type-G firm better off. 
However, the situation is completely different for a type-B firm. With a spinoff, the 
type-B firm is strictly worse off than no spinoff because informed demand is more 
informative. Assuming the quality of the non-core business of the firm is low, with a 
spinoff, informed traders will not invest in shares of N. The equilibrium price of N 
will be adjusted downwards and the divergence between the true value and the 
equilibrium price will be narrowed. Therefore, it is not optimal for the type-B firm to 
carry out a spinoff. 
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The general implication of our analysis suggests that under the assumption of market 
value maximization, the reason for spinoffs is to increase the information sensitivity 
because this will make information acquisition more profitable and enhance the 
firm's expected market value. However, if the objective of managers is not to 
maximize the benefits of shareholders, type-B firm may also carry out a spinoff in 
order to maximize the benefits of the managers.^ 
5 In the real world, market value maximization is not the only objective for a firm. Besides market 
value maximization, it is likely that there are other motives behind spinoff. That is why bad firm may 
also spinoff due to its own objectives. Investors cannot infer whether a firm is G or B by observing its 
spinoff activity. Therefore, information acquisition is valuable for uninformed investors. 
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D. Data Description^ 
We analyze a sample of Hong Kong spinoffs. We only consider cases where both 
parent firms and spinoffs are listed in Hong Kong. 
7 . 
A number of spinoffs had to be eliminated from the original sample . For example, if 
a parent firm listed in Hong Kong spins off a subsidiary in other countries, this 
spinoff is excluded. We also eliminated those spinoffs listed in Hong Kong with 
parent firms not listed in Hong Kong. The third reason is that for a few number of 
companies no stock prices were available in bigcharts.com. The final sample consists 
of 21 observations. Table 1 lists all the observations. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
There was one spinoff case each year in 1994 and 1995. Year 1996 was the busiest 
year, having 8 spinoffs. There were two spinoffs in 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2002. In 
1998 and 2003，there was no spinoff. The average number of spinoffs in Hong Kong 
is 2.1 per year. 
6 The subsidiaries divested in the spinoff transactions are identified by checking South China Morning 
Post articles on Lexis-Nexis. The sample covers the period from January 1994 to June 2003. Data on 
stock prices and the first trading dates of spinoffs are extracted from bigcharts.com. 
7 These exclusions may have some impacts on the empirical results. 
18 
E. Total Market Value Analysis^ 
According to our model, it is a market value maximizing strategy for a firm to 
spinoff. By adding up the total market capitalization of both parents and spinoffs and 
tracing the movements of this total value relative to the total market capitalization of 
Hong Kong stock market, we can know whether the market-adjusted total value of 
the combined firm has increased or not after spinoff. 
In Table 2a, the market capitalization ratios of 14 companies are included. We 
calculate the market capitalization ratios before and after the spinoffs. 
TABLE 2a HERE 
In Table 2b, the percentage change in market capitalization ratio after spinoff 
compared with the pre-spinoff year is reported. Spinoff has positive impact on the 
market capitalization ratio of 11 out of 14 companies. The average changes in market 
capitalization ratio for 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods are 120.52%, 135.15% and 
8 For an individual firm, the market capitalization depends on both the price and the number of 
outstanding stocks. We have taken these two factors into our consideration. For the market as a whole, 
the market capitalization depends also on the addition and deletion of listings. We do not capture these 
in our analysis because the number of the addition and deletion of listings is small compared with the 
total number of listings in Hong Kong stock market and the impact on the overall market 
capitalization is trivial. 
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80.96% respectively. These results indicate that the average market capitalization 
ratio has increased dramatically after spinoffs. It is likely that the motive behind a 
spinoff is to increase total market value of the firm. 
TABLE 2b HERE 
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Chapter Three: Case Study 
In this chapter, we study Hong Kong spinoffs to examine whether abnormal returns 
of spinoffs exist in Hong Kong. 
A. Methodology 
For subsidiaries, buy-and-hold returns are computed for each stock i as 
n -巧，0 
V 巧，o y 
where P.�is the price of stock i in the first trading date and P“t is the price of 
stock i at time t. 
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B. Empirical Results 
1. Buy-and-hold returns of spinoffs 
At this section, the returns of holding the stocks of spinoffs are calculated without 
comparing to any benchmark. We will compare the returns of holding the stocks of 
spinoffs with a benchmark return later in order to examine whether there is any 
abnormal returns from buying the stocks of spinoffs. 
Table 3 presents the buy-and-hold returns for intervals of 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 
4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods following the initial 
trading date for subsidiaries. In calculating the buy-and-hold returns, if a stock in the 
sample stops trading for any reason for a particular closing date, the buy-and-hold 
returns are computed using the nearest calendar date's available stock price. For 
example, if we have to use Monday's stock price for calculation but it is a holiday, 
we will use Tuesday's stock price instead. 
Concerning the average buy-and-hold returns over a short-term horizon, positive 
returns are generated over 1-week and 2-week holding periods following the spinoff. 
Negative returns are generated over 3-week, 4-week, 3-month and 6-month periods. 
Besides, the positive returns over the two short periods are relatively small compared 
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with the negative returns over the other 4 periods. The average buy-and-hold returns 
of subsidiary stocks for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month and 6-month 
periods following the initial trading date are 1.93%, 0.56%, -2.75%, -4.20%, 
-15.86% and -9.08% respectively. 
As shown in Table 3, the average buy-and-hold returns over longer time intervals are 
negative. The average buy-and-hold returns of subsidiary stocks for 1-year, 2-year 
and 3-year periods following the initial trading date are -15.82%, -27.37% 
and -51.19% respectively. It seems that there is a tendency for the stock prices of the 
subsidiaries to adjust downwards over time. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
2. Blue chips versus non-blue chips 
For subsidiaries whose parents are blue chip companies, as shown in the upper part 
of Table 4, the average buy-and-hold returns for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 
3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods following the initial trading date 
are 4.402%, -2.714%, -6.112%, -9.801%, -25.236%, -22.727%, -26.338%, -38.956% 
and -56.4% respectively. There is positive buy-and-hold average return over the 
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1-week holding period. Negative average buy-and-hold returns appear over 2-week, 
3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year holding periods. 
For subsidiaries whose parents are non-blue chip companies, as shown in the lower 
part of Table 4, the average buy-and-hold returns for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 
4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods following the initial 
trading date are -0.301%, 3.539%, 0.299%, 0.898%, -7.343%, 3.323%, -8.167%, 
-18.109% and -47.141% respectively. Positive average buy-and-hold returns are 
generated over 2-week, 3-week, 4-week and 6-month holding periods. Negative 
average buy-and-hold returns are generated over 1-week, 3-month, 1-year, 2-year and 
3-year holding periods. 
Compared with subsidiaries whose parents are blue chip companies, the average 
buy-and-hold returns of non-blue chip companies' subsidiaries are larger over all 
holding periods excluding the 1-year holding period. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
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3. Main board versus Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) 
For subsidiaries listed in the main board, as shown in Table 5, the average 
buy-and-hold returns for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 
2-year and 3-year periods following the initial trading date are —0.474%, -0.499%, 
-3.985%, -4.82%, -13.995%, -4.803%, -23.343%, -42.546% and -46.551% 
respectively. Negative average buy-and-hold returns are generated over all time 
intervals. 
For subsidiaries listed in the GEM, as shown in Table 6, the average buy-and-hold 
returns for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 
3-year periods following the initial trading date are 12.19%, 5.0675%, 2.4775%, 
-1.5475%, -23.8025%, -27.2675%, 24.3133%, 48.4833% and -83.68%. Positive 
average buy-and-hold returns appear over 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 1-year and 
2-year periods. Negative average buy-and-hold returns are generated over 4-week, 
3-month, 6-month and 3-year periods. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
TABLE 6 HERE 
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4. The relationship between buy-and-hold returns and listing years 
Hong Kong stock market has undergone both economic boom and recession in the 
past decade. The market performed very well before the Asian financial crisis but 
performed poorly after the crisis. Apparently, the stock market is adversely affected 
by the Asian economic turmoil, 9-11 incident as well as the US corporate governance 
crisis. Are the buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of the spinoffs related to 
the listing year? 
In Table 7, the relationship between the short-run buy-and-hold returns of the 
spinoffs and their listing years is studied. We focus on 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 
4-week, 3-month and 6-month returns in order to study the short-period returns after 
the listing dates. In regression 1，we present the results for the 1-week buy-and-hold 
return. In regression 2, we show the results for the 2-week horizon. Regression 3 
presents the results for the 3-week interval. Regression 4 shows the results for the 
4-week buy-and-hold return. Regression 5 illustrates the results for the 3-month 
period. In regression 6，the results for the 6-month horizon are presented. 
The results are quite impressive because the coefficients of the dummy variables are 
insignificant in all the regressions. All dummy variables have low t-statistics in all 
regressions. Therefore, it is unlikely that the short-run buy-and-hold returns can be 
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explained by the listing years. It can be concluded that there is not much evidence for 
the impact of listing years on the short-run buy-and-hold returns. 
TABLE 7 HERE 
After studying the relationship between the short-run buy-and-hold returns of the 
spinoffs and their listing years, we are going to study the relationship between the 
long-run buy-and-hold returns of the spinoffs and their listing years. The results are 
presented in Table 8. Regression 7 shows the results for the 1-year buy-and-hold 
return. In regression 8, the results for the 2-year buy-and-hold return are shown. In 
regression 9, the results for the 3-year buy-and-hold return are presented. 
We find that the coefficients of all dummy variables in regression 7 and regression 8 
are insignificant. The coefficients of all dummy variables in regression 9 are 
significant and all dummy variables have high t-statistics in regression 9. In addition, 
it can be remarked that the explanatory powers of both regression 7 and regression 8 
are relatively low but the explanatory power of regression 9 is relatively high. 
Therefore, there is not much evidence for the relationship between both 1-year and 
2-year buy-and-hold returns and the corresponding listing years, but there is some 
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evidence for the relationship between 3-year buy-and-hold returns and the 
corresponding listing years. 
TABLE 8 HERE 
5. Buy-and-hold returns of parents 
For parents, buy-and-hold returns are computed for each stock i as 
r, — ( Pi,t — Pi,Q � = p , 
V r/,0 J 
where P.�is the price of stock i in the first trading date of its spinoff and P. , is 
the price of stock i at time t. 
As shown in Table 9, regarding the average buy-and-hold returns of holding the 
shares of parents over a short-term horizon, positive returns are generated over 
4-week and 6-month holding periods. Negative returns are generated over 1-week, 
2-week, 3-week and 3-month periods. The average buy-and-hold returns of parent 
stocks for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month and 6-month periods following 
the initial trading date of their spinoffs are -0.995%, -0.881%, -0.069%, 0.603%, 
-3.619% and 13.313% respectively. 
Besides, the average buy-and-hold returns of holding parent stocks over longer time 
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intervals are also presented in Table 9. Positive returns are generated over 1-year 
period. Negative returns are generated over 2-year and 3-year holding periods. The 
average buy-and-hold returns of parents for 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods 
following the initial trading date of their spinoffs are 10.517%, -24.736% 
and -32.535% respectively. 
TABLE 9 HERE 
6. Excess return 
In this section, we try to compare the returns of holding the stocks of spinoffs and 
parents with benchmark returns to examine whether there are excess returns 
embedded in the stocks of both spinoffs and parents. Hang Seng Index is adopted as 
the benchmark in this analysis. If the buy-and-hold returns of the spinoffs or parents 
are higher than that of the Hang Seng Index, excess returns are said to exist. 
In Table 10, the excess returns are calculated as the difference between the spinoff 
returns and the returns of Hang Seng Index. The average buy-and-hold returns of the 
spinoffs net of the return of Hang Seng Index for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 
3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods following the initial trading date 
are 0.278%, -0.261%, -3.247%, -4.522%, -14.617%, -8.047%, -14.047%, -15.829% 
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and -59.204% respectively. Excess returns only appear over 1-week holding period. 
Over 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods, 
buying the stocks of spinoffs cannot beat the market and fail to bring higher returns 
to investors. 
TABLE 10 HERE 
In Table 11, the excess returns are calculated as the difference between the parent 
returns and the returns of Hang Seng Index. The average buy-and-hold returns of the 
parents net of the return of Hang Seng Index for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 
3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods following the initial trading date 
are -2.167%, -1.556%, -0.406%, 0.402%, -1.588%, 13.955%, 14.013%, -7.052% 
and -38.816% respectively. Excess returns only exist for 4-week, 6-month and 
l-year holding period. Over 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 3-month, 6-month, 2-year and 
3-year periods, there is no excess return. 
TABLE 11 HERE 
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7. Sub-indexes Analysis 
We have compared the returns of holding the stocks of spinoffs and parents with the 
market return of Hang Seng Index. However, Hang Seng Index is unable to reflect 
the excess returns of holding the stocks of spinoffs and parents precisely.^ Currently, 
Hang Seng Index is comprised of 33 constituent stocks which are representative of 
the market. The constituent stocks are grouped under Finance, Utilities, Properties 
and Commerce and Industry sub-indexes. The returns across different sectors are not 
the same. In order to examine whether there are excess returns embedded in the 
stocks of both spinoffs and parents much more precisely, in this section, we try to 
compare the returns of holding the stocks of spinoffs and parents with corresponding 
sub-indexes. 
Table 12 shows the business classification of the spinoffs. Three spinoffs are 
classified as consolidated enterprises. One spinoff is in the sector of finance. Four 
spinoffs are listed on the GEM board. Seven spinoffs are classified as industrials. 
Four spinoffs belong to the sector of properties. 
TABLE 12 HERE 
9 The returns of individual stocks in excess of the Heng Seng Index return can be misleading because 
the risk level of individual stocks is different from that of the Heng Seng Index. In order to control the 
risk factor, Heng Seng Sub-indexes should be used for the calculation of the excess return. 
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In Table 13，the adjusted buy-and-hold returns are calculated by comparing the 
buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of spinoffs with their corresponding 
sub-indexes either the Hong Kong HKSE AOI Consolidated Enterprises Index, the 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Finance Index, the Hong Kong Hang Seng Commerce & 
Industry Index, or the Hong Kong Hang Seng Properties. As the GEM index is not 
available in earlier period, we cannot obtain the adjusted buy-and-hold returns of 
holding the shares of spinoffs listed in the GEM board. 
The average buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of spinoffs net of the return 
of corresponding sub-indexes for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 
6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods following the initial trading date 
are -2.36%, -1.98%, -4.82%, -6.01%, -12.95%, -2.38%, -13.45%, -14.07% 
and -34.86% respectively. No excess return is generated over all holding periods. 
TABLE 13 HERE 
The business classification of parents is listed in Table 14. Five parents are classified 
as consolidated enterprises. Four parents are classified as industrials. Five parents are 
classified as properties. One parent is classified as utilities. 
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TABLE 14 HERE 
In Table 15, the adjusted buy-and-hold returns are calculated by comparing the 
buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of parents with the corresponding 
sub-indexes including Hong Kong HKSE AOI Consolidated Enterprises Index, Hong 
Kong Hang Seng Utilities Index, Hong Kong Hang Seng Commerce & Industry 
Index and Hong Kong Hang Seng Properties. 
The average buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of parents net of the return of 
corresponding sub-indexes for 1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 
1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods following the initial trading date are -2.36%, 
-2.47%, -1.05%，-0.60%, -1.90%, 14.56%, 16.72%, 6.22% and-15.68% respectively. 
Excess returns are generated over 6-month, 1-year and 2-year holding periods. Over 
1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month and 3-year periods, there is no excess 
return. 
TABLE 15 HERE 
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Chapter Four; Growth, Profitability and Financial Health 
The quality of a firm can be evaluated by examining the firm's financial strengths 
and weaknesses. We try to use three essential criteria to determine the quality of a 
firm. The three criteria include growth, profitability and financial health. The data of 
this chapter is taken from Datastream. 
A. Growth 
With all other factors remain the same, upward trends of sales, earnings, book value, 
and dividends are generally good signs for investment. Some financial ratios are 
widely used indicators for evaluating the growth of a firm. They include earnings per 
share, dividends per share, market to book value and sales per share. 
1. Earnings Per Share 
Earnings per share (EPS) is one of the most widely watched ratio. It is based on the 
number of shares outstanding on the balance sheet. EPS is computed as follows: 
Income 
Earnings per share = — 7 : . 
Average number of snares 
In Table 16，EPS of 19 spinoffs are reported. The average EPS of spinoffs of seven 
consecutive years following the listing date are 0.55, 0.25, 0.26, 0.36, 0.37, 0.16 and 
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0.37 respectively. Among the seven years, the EPS is highest in the first year. 
TABLE 16 HERE 
2. Dividends Per Share 
Dividends per share is also based on the number of shares outstanding on the balance 
sheet. It is computed as follows: 
Dividends 
Dividends per share 二 —: . 
Average number of snares 
In Table 17, dividends per share ratios of 19 spinoffs are reported. The average 
dividends per share of spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the listing date 
are 0.06，0.1, 0.12, 0.16, 0.16, 0.09 and 0.18 respectively. Among the seven years, 
the dividends per share is lowest in the first year. 
TABLE 17 HERE 
3. Market to Book Value 
Market value of stock reflects the current stock price. Book value reflects the 
owners' equity. Book value has no relationship with market value. We can make use 
of market to book value to compare the market value of stocks with the book value. 
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Usually, a high ratio indicates a company with good growth potential. Market to 
book value is computed as follow: 
, 7 7 Market value of shares 
Market to book value = — . 
Book value of shares 
The market to book value ratios of spinoffs are shown in Table 18. The average 
market to book value ratios of spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the 
listing date are 2.45, 2.57, 2.46，0.78, 0.5, 0.47 and 0.38 respectively. 
TABLE 18 HERE 
4. Sales Per Share 
The amount of sales is essential for the growth and prospect of a company. If the 
sales amount drops, it may be due to a decrease in market share or the decline of the 
industry. Sales per share is computed as follows: 
1 Sales 
Sales per share = — . 
Ave arg e number of shares 
The total sales of spinoffs is shown in Table 19. The average total sales of spinoffs of 
seven consecutive years following the listing date are 1,524,599, 1,990,413， 
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1,312,761, 1,377,745, 1,067,609, 635,350 and 601,533 respectively. 
The sales per share is reported in Table 20. The sales per share of spinoffs of seven 
consecutive years following the listing date are 2.28, 2.25, 1.58，2.35, 1.61，1.35 and 
1.15 respectively. 
TABLE 19 HERE 
TABLE 20 HERE 
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B. Profitability 
Profitability is an important aspect of a firm. A firm with high profitability is 
regarded as a good firm. A firm with low profitability is regarded as a bad firm. By 
studying key financial ratios including price/earnings ratio, return on equity, return 
on asset and quality of income, we can have a better understanding about the 
profitability of spinoffs. 
1. Price/Earnings Ratio 
The price/earnings (P/E) ratio measures the relationship between the market price of 
the stock and its earnings per share. The P/E ratio for spinoffs is computed as 
follows: 
Market price per share 
Price I earnings ratio = : • 
Earnings per snare 
The P/E ratio of spinoffs is reported in Table 21 in which the P/E ratios of 19 spinoffs 
are calculated. 
TABLE 21 HERE 
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2. Return on Equity 
Return on equity is a fundamental test of profitability. It relates income to the 
investment that was made by the owners to earn income. The return on equity is 
computed as follows: 
Income 
Return on equity = . 
Owners'equity 
Table 22 shows the return on equity of spinoffs. The average return on equity ratios 
of spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the listing date are 6.28%, 2.39%, 
-7.12%, -5.9%, 2.85%, -13.14% and 4.68% respectively. This result indicates that the 
return on equity is the best at the first year. There are three years with negative return 
on equity. 
TABLE 22 HERE 
3. Return on Asset 
Another view of the return on investment concept relates income to total assets used 
to earn income. Some analysts regard the return on asset ratio as a better measure of 
the ability of management to utilize assets independent of how the assets were 
financed. Return on asset is computed as follows: 
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Income 
Return on asset = . 
Total asset 
Table 23 shows the return on asset of spinoffs. The average return on asset ratios of 
spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the listing date are 2.85%, 1.67%, 
-0.14%, 0.55%, 1.07%, -4.39% and 0.69% respectively. This result indicates that the 
return on asset is the highest at the first year. There are two years with negative 
return on equity. 
TABLE 23 HERE 
4. Quality of Income 
Some accounting procedures such as accelerated depreciation and LIFO are 
considered conservative because they tend to produce lower reported earnings 
compared with less conservative procedures. The quality of a company's earnings is 
about the issue of whether a company's earnings are generated by its operations or 
the aggressive use of accounting procedures. A measure of the quality of income is 
computed as follows: 
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Cash flows from operating activities 
Quality of income • 
Net income 
The quality of income is reported in Table 24. The quality of income ratios of 
spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the listing date are 0.27，2.99, 1.37, 
4.78, 2.01, -1.74 and 6.82 respectively. A ratio higher than 1 is considered to indicate 
higher quality of earnings because each dollar of income is supported by at least one 
dollar of cash flow. Based on this result, we know that at the first year following the 
initial public offerings, the earning quality of spinoffs is very low, with the quality of 
income ratio less than 0.3，compared with that of other years. 
TABLE 24 HERE 
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C. Financial Health 
With the collapses we have seen at Global Crossing, UAL, WorldCom and scores of 
other companies, financial health has taken on newfound importance for many 
investors. In this section, cash ratio, current ratio and debt-to-equity ratio will be 
taken into consideration for the evaluation of the financial health of spinoffs. 
1. Cash Ratio 
Cash is the life of business. A business will fail without sufficient cash. Cash is also 
the most liquid asset. Without cash, a company cannot meet obligations to its 
creditors and cannot pay its employees. A measure of the adequacy of available cash 
is called the cash ratio. It is computed as follows: 
， Cash + Cash equivalents 
Cash ratio 二 • 
Current liabilities 
In Table 25, the cash ratios of 19 spinoffs are calculated. The cash ratios of spinoffs 
of seven consecutive years following the listing date are 3.04, 1.42，0.61，0.45, 1.14, 
1.14 and 0.3 respectively. There is a downtrend of the cash ratios. The ratio of the 
first year is the highest. Compared the ratio of the first year with that of other years, 
we found that the ratios of other years are at least 50% less than that of the first year. 
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In Table 26, the cash ratios of 17 spinoffs are calculated. Two firms, which have been 
listed in Hong Kong stock market for 1 year, are excluded in the calculation. The 
new cash ratios of spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the listing date are 
2.44，1.42, 0.61, 0.45, 1.14, 1.14 and 0.3 respectively. By excluding those spinoffs 
which only have one-year history in the sample, the average cash ratio of spinoffs in 
the first year decreases by 19.7%. However, the ratio of the first year is still higher 
than that of other years. 
These results reveal that the financial health of spinoffs is deteriorating over time. 
The adequacy of available cash is reducing. 
TABLE 25 HERE 
TABLE 26 HERE 
2. Current Ratio 
Cash ratio is very sensitive to small events. For instance, the cash ratio may be 
significantly affected by the collection of a large account receivable. The current 
ratio is less sensitive to the timing of certain transaction. It measures the relationship 
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between total current assets and total current liabilities at a specific date. It helps 
evaluate the adequacy of working capital. This ratio is computed as follows: 
^ Cureent assets 
Current ratio = . 
Current liabilities 
In Table 27，the current ratios of 19 spinoffs are calculated. The current ratios of 
spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the listing date are 4.4, 2.52, 1.41, 1.46, 
2.5，2.33 and 1.55 respectively. There is also a downtrend of the current ratios. The 
ratio of the first year is still the highest. Compared the ratio of the first year with that 
of other years, we found that the ratios of other years are at least 40% less than that 
of the first year. 
In Table 28, the cash ratios of 17 spinoffs are calculated. Two firms, which have been 
listed in Hong Kong stock market for 1 year, are deleted. The new current ratios of 
spinoffs of seven consecutive years following the listing date are 3.75, 2.52, 1.41, 
1.46, 2.5，2.33 and 1.55 respectively. By excluding those spinoffs which only have 
one-year history in the sample, the average current ratio of spinoffs in the first year 
decreases by 14.8%. However, the ratio of the first year is still higher than that of 
other years. 
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TABLE 27 HERE 
TABLE 28 HERE 
3. Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
The debt-to-equity ratio expresses the proportion between debt and owner's equity. It 
is a measure of the ability of a company to meet its long-term obligations on a 
continuing basis. Debt is risky for a company because it imposes important 
contractual obligations. In spite of the risk associated with debt, most companies 
obtain a large amount of resources form creditors because of the advantages of 
financial leverage. In addition, interest expense is deductible in the consideration of 
profit tax. When selecting an optimal capital structure, a company has to balance the 
higher returns associated with leverage against the risk associated with debt. Due to 
the importance of the risk-and-retum relationship, the debt-to-equity ratio is 
considered to be a key part of any company evaluation. This ratio is computed as 
follows: 
， . Total liabilities 
Debt-to-equity ratio = • 
Owners' Equity 
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As shown in Table 29，the debt-to-equity ratios of spinoffs of seven consecutive 
years following the listing date are 0.37, 0.46, 0.74，0.42, 0.35，0.43 and 0.51 
respectively. This time the average debt-to-equity ratio of the first year is second 
lowest in the sample period. 
TABLE 29 HERE 
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Chapter Five; Conclusion 
This paper explains why in an asymmetric information framework, it is a market 
value maximizing strategy for a “good” firm to spinoff its subsidiaries but not an 
optimal strategy for a “bad” firm to carry out a spinoff. The general implication of 
our model suggests that the motive behind spinoffs is to increase the information 
sensitivity because this makes information acquisition more profitable and helps 
reduce the divergence between the true value and the equilibrium market value of a 
firm. 
This paper also examines the stock returns of spinoffs and their parent firms for 
periods of up to three years following the spinoffs in Hong Kong. This research is 
motivated by the scarcity of empirical study on spinoffs outside the US and the 
European countries. Contrary to previous empirical findings, we observe inferior 
investment performance for spinoffs in Hong Kong. Spinoffs in Hong Kong provide 
negative returns over both short-term and long-term horizons. Our results indicate 
that the abnormal returns of spinoffs are not a universal phenomenon. Instead, it is 
only regionally applicable. Unlike the US and European spinoffs, Hong Kong 
spinoffs cannot bring abnormal returns to investors. Besides, based on the financial 
ratio analysis, we find that profitability, growth and financial health of spinoffs are 
better in the first listing year. 
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Moreover, we found that after spinoffs, the total market value of firms increases 
rapidly. This result is consistent to our theory that spinoff can facilitate a firm to 
enhance the total market value. 
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Table 1: Spinoff sample in Hong Kong (Jan 1994 - June 2003) 
Parent Spinoff 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Cheung Kong Infrastructure 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) CK Life Sciences International 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Tom.com 
Chevalier International Holdings Chevalier Construction Holdings 
China National Offshore Oil Corp China Oilfield Services Ltd 
China Resources Enterprises China Resources Beijing Land 
Guangdong Investment Guangdong Brewery Holdings 
Guangdong Investment Guangdong Tannery 
Henderson Land Development Henderson China 
Kowloon Motor Bus Holdings Roadshow 
Lai Sun Development Co Lai Fung Holdings 
Legend Group Digital China Holdings 
LIU Chong Hing Investment Liu Chong Hing Bank 
New World Development New World China Land 
New World Development New World Infrastructure 
Pacific Concord Holding Concord Land Development Co 
Sinolink Worldwide Holdings Panva Gas Holdings 
Sun Hung Kai Properties SUNeVision Holdings 
Wai Kee Holdings Road King Infrastructure 
Wharf (Holdings) i-Cable Communications 
Winsor Industrial Corporation Winsor Properties Holdings 
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Table 2a; Market Capitalization Ratio 
Combined Firm 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 0.0437* 0.0529 0.0521 0.0626 0.0578 0.0545 0.0575 0.0450 
China National Offshore Oil Corp 0.0152* 0.0238 
Henderson Land Development 0.0333* 0.0395 0.0208 0.0265 0.0196 0.0143 0.0158 0.0115 
Legend Group 0.0075* 0.0083 0.0060 
New World Development 0.0239* 0.0324 0.0209 0.0182 0.0111 0.0056 0.0052 0.0034 
Sun Hung Kai Properties 0.0432* 0.0393 0.0390 0.0312 
Wharf (Holdings) 0.0097* 0.0094 0.0095 0.0118 0.0099 
China Resources Enterprises 0.0020* 0.0092 0.0098 0.0089 0.0058 0.0045 0.0044 0.0043 
Guangdong Investment 0.0039* 0.0052 0.0046 0.0017 0.0008 0.0006 0.0011 0.0016 
W l o o n Motor Bus Holdings 0.0015* 0.0039 0.0042 
Pacific Concord Holding 0.0009* 0.0025 0.0007 0.0017 0.0010 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 
Sinolink Worldwide Holdings 0.0001* 0.0004 0.0007 
Wai Kee Holdings 0.0002* 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0008 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 
Winsor Industrial Corporation 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
Market capitalization ratio is defined as the total market capitalization of the combined firm including 
both parent and spinoffs relative to the total market capitalization of the Hong Kong stock market. The 
data is derived from Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly. 
* indicates the ratio of the pre-spinoff year. In this table, the parents under the category of combined 
firm represent both the parents and their spinoffs. 
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Table 2b: Change in Market Capitalization Ratio Compared with Pre-spinoff Year (%) 
Combined Firm 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 21.04 19.05 43.08 
China National Offshore Oil Corp 56.32 
Henderson Land Development 18.60 -37.56 -20.59 
Legend Group 10.47 -20.25 
New World Development 35.86 -12.54 -23.59 
Sun Hung Kai Properties -8.90 -9.60 -27.65 
Wharf (Holdings) -3.19 -2.50 21.14 
China Resources Enterprises 366.80 396.10 351.52 
Guangdong Investment 32.05 17.32 -56.36 
Kowloon Motor Bus Holdings 157.87 176.52 
Pacific Concord Holding 173.61 -25.75 90.56 
Sinolink Worldwide Holdings 385.11 770.83 
Wai Kee Holdings 459.07 519.20 497.89 
Winsor Industrial Corporation -17.37 -33.91 -66.44 
Average Change 120.52 135.15 80.96 
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Table 3; Buy-and-hold returns (%) of subsidiary stocks for 1-week, 2-week. 3-week. 4-week, 
3-month，6-month, 1-vean 2-vear and 3-vear periods following the initial trading date 
1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 0 -3.56 -5.14 -2.37 9.49 80.24 107.11 19.37 28.46 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 3.03 -1.52 -1.52 3.03 -3.03 -9.09 -13.64 -32.58 -83.33 
China Oilfield Services Ltd -5.29 3.7 2.65 1.59 4.76 -9.52 
China Resources Beijing Land 1.23 17.28 18.52 8.64 11.11 30.86 -8.64 -40.12 -71.6 
C K L i f e Sciences International -6.67 -3.57 -11.43 -16.19 -33.33 -31.43 
Concord Land Development 0.74 -2.94 2.21 -1.47 0.74 76.47 -14.71 -49.71 -46.18 
Digital China Holdings 4.81 -8.02 -3.21 -11.23 -48.66 -28.88 -18.18 -47.06 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings -5.56 12.96 -18.52 -5.56 -57.04 -57.04 -87.04 -80.37 -87.96 
Guangdong Tannery -4.35 5.98 10.05 11.41 25 76.63 -51.09 -85.33 -86.96 
Henderson China 0.48 -2.46 -3.36 -4.93 -22.42 -21.08 -37.67 -73.09 -87.11 
i-Cable Communications -1.17 -8.63 -25.49 -28.24 -35.29 -78.43 -74.12 -65.49 -74.9 
Lai Fung Holdings -1.75 -4.39 -5.26 -4.39 -53.33 -75.44 -86.67 -80.7 -88.77 
Liu Chong Ring Bank -0.49 -0.97 0.49 -0.97 -4.85 -24.27 -8.74 5.83 135.92 
New World China Land -4.73 -15.38 -21.3 -34.32 -58.8 -75.15 -71.6 -59.76 -75.74 
New World Infrastructure 0 -2.59 -7.04 -1.85 8.89 27.41 42.22 55.56 -18.15 
Panva Gas Holdings -1.16 10.47 8.14 10.47 15.12 12.79 231.4 286.63 
Road King Infrastructure -1.38 -6.2 -8.97 -9.66 -8.28 -10.34 -13.1 -28.28 -16.55 
Roadshow -13.2 -11.32 -25.66 -27.55 -46.42 -22.64 -16.98 
SUNeVision Holdings -3.41 -28.57 -32.61 -37.89 -52.48 -63.98 -85.56 -89.57 -93.17 
Tom.com 60 41.94 45.81 37.42 -24.52 -26.45 -72.9 -51.61 -74.19 
Winsor Properties Holdings 19.58 19.58 23.81 25.93 40.21 38.62 -20.63 -76.46 -78.84 
Average B & H Returns 1-94 0.56 -2.75 -4.2 -15.86 -9.08 -15.82 -27.37 -51-19 
52 
Table 4; Buy-and-hold returns (%) of the blue chip spinoffs and non-blue chip spinoffs for 
1-week, 2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, l-yean 2-vear and 3-vear periods following 
the initial trading date 
Blue Chip Spinoffs 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 0 -3.56 -5.14 -2.37 9.49 80.24 107.1 19.37 28.46 
China Oilfield Services Ltd -5.29 3.7 2.65 1.59 4.76 -9.52 
CK Life Sciences International -6.67 -3.57 -11.43 -16.19 -33.33 -31.43 
Digital China Holdings 4.81 -8.02 -3.21 -11.23 -48.66 -28.88 -18.2 -47.1 
Henderson China 0.48 -2.46 -3.36 -4.93 -22.42 -21.08 -37.7 -73.1 -87.11 
i-Cable Communications -1.17 -8.63 -25.49 -28.24 -35.29 -78.43 -74.1 -65.5 -74.9 
New World China Land -4.73 -15.38 -21.3 -34.32 -58.8 -75.15 -71.6 -59.8 -75.74 
New World Infrastructure 0 -2.59 -7.04 -1.85 8.89 27.41 42.22 55.56 -18.15 
SUNeVision Holdings -3.41 -28.57 -32.61 -37.89 -52.48 -63.98 -85.6 -89.6 -93.17 
Tom.com 60 41.94 45.81 37.42 -24.52 -26.45 -72.9 -51.6 -74.19 
Average B&H Returns 4.4 -2.71 -6.11 -9.8 -25.24 -22.73 -26.34 -38.96 -56.4 
Non-Blue Chip Spinoffs 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 3.03 -1.52 -1.52 3.03 -3.03 -9.09 -13.6 -32.6 -83.33 
China Resources Beijing Land 1.23 17.28 18.52 8.64 11.11 30.86 -8.64 -40.1 -71.6 
Concord Land Development 0.74 -2.94 2.21 -1.47 0.74 76.47 -14.7 -49.7 -46.18 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings -5.56 12.96 -18.52 -5.56 -57.04 -57.04 -87 -80.4 -87.96 
Guangdong Tannery -4.35 5.98 10.05 11.41 25 76.63 -51.1 -85.3 -86.96 
Lai Fung Holdings -1.75 -4.39 -5.26 -4.39 -53.33 -75.44 -86.7 -80.7 -88.77 
Liu Chong Hing Bank -0.49 -0.97 0.49 -0.97 -4.85 -24.27 -8.74 5.83 135.9 
Panva Gas Holdings -1.16 10.47 8.14 10.47 15.12 12.79 231.4 286.6 
Road King Infrastructure -1.38 -6.2 -8.97 -9.66 -8.28 -10.34 -13.1 -28.3 -16.55 
Roadshow -13.2 -11.32 -25.66 -27.55 -46.42 -22.64 -17 
Winsor Properties Holdings 19.58 19.58 23.81 25.93 40.21 38.62 -20.6 -76.5 -78.84 
Average B&H Returns -0.3 3.54 0.3 0.9 -7.34 3.32 -8.17 -18.11 -47.14 
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Table 5: Buy-and-hold returns (%) of subsidiary stock listed in the main board for 1-week, 
2-week, 3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-vear, 2-vear and 3-vear periods following the 
initial trading date 
1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 0.00 -3.56 -5.14 -2.37 9.49 80.24 107.10 19.37 28.46 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 3.03 -1.52 -1.52 3.03 -3.03 -9.09 -13.60 -32.58 -83.33 
China Oilfield Services Ltd -5.29 3.70 2.65 1.59 4.76 -9.52 
China Resources Beijing Land 1.23 17.28 18.52 8.64 11.11 30.86 -8.64 -40.12 -71.60 
Concord Land Development 0.74 -2.94 2.21 -1.47 0.74 76.47 -14.70 -49.71 -46.18 
Digital China Holdings 4.81 -8.02 -3.21 -11.23 -48.66 -28.88 -18.20 -47.06 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings -5.56 12.96 -18.52 -5.56 -57.04 -57.04 -87.00 -80.37 -87.96 
Guangdong Tannery -4.35 5.98 10.05 11.41 25.00 76.63 -51.10 -85.33 -86.96 
Henderson China 0.48 -2.46 -3.36 -4.93 -22.42 -21.08 -37.70 -73.09 -87.11 
i-Cable Communications -1.17 -8.63 -25.49 -28.24 -35.29 -78.43 -74.10 -65.49 -74.90 
Lai Fung Holdings -1.75 -4.39 -5.26 -4.39 -53.33 -75.44 -86.70 -80.70 -88.77 
Liu Chong Hing Bank -0.49 -0.97 0.49 -0.97 -4.85 -24.27 -8.74 5.83 135.90 
New World China Land -4.73 -15.38 -21.30 -34.32 -58.80 -75.15 -71.60 -59.76 -75.74 
New World Infrastructure 0.00 -2.59 -7.04 -1.85 8.89 27.41 42.22 55.56 -18.15 
Road King Infrastructure -1.38 -6.20 -8.97 -9.66 -8.28 -10.34 -13.10 -28.28 -16.55 
Roadshow -13.20 -11.32 -25.66 -27.55 -46.42 -22.64 -17.00 
Winsor Properties Holdings 19.58 19.58 23.81 25.93 40.21 38.62 -20.60 -76.46 -78.84 
Average B & H Returns -0.47 -0.50 -3.99 -4.82 -14.00 -4.80 -23.34 -42.55 -46.55 
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Table 6: Buy-and-hold returns (%) of subsidiary stock listed in the GEM for 1-week, 2-week, 
3-week, 4-week, 3-month, 6-month, 1-vean 2-vear and 3-vear periods following the initial 
trading date 
1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
C K Life Sciences International -6.67 -3.57 -11.43 -16.19 -33.33 -31.43 
Panva Gas Holdings -1.16 10.47 8.14 10.47 15.12 12.79 231.40 286.63 
SUNeVision Holdings -3.41 -28.57 -32.61 -37.89 -52.48 -63.98 -85.56 -89.57 -93.17 
T o m . c o m 60.00 41.94 45.81 37.42 -24.52 -26.45 -72.90 -51.61 -74.19 
Average B & H Returns 12.19 5.07 2.48 -1.55 -23.80 -27.27 24.31 48.48 -83.68 
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Table 7: Regression of short-run buy-and-hold return (%); spinoffs 
Variable 1 -week return 2-week return 3-week return 4-week return 3-month return 6-month 
return 
Intercept -0.49 -0.97 0.49 -0.97 -4.85 -24.27 
(-0.03) (-0.06) (0.03) (-0.05) (-0.21) (-0.72) 
Dummy 1995 0.49 -1.62 -7.53 -0.88 13.74 51.68 
(0.02) (-0.07) (-0.28) (-0.03) (0.43) (1.08) 
Dummy 1996 2.91 4.24 3.96 4.79 11.45 57.06 
(0.2) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (0.48) (1.6) 
Dummy 1997 -3.17 5.26 -12.38 -4.01 -50.34 -41.97 
(-0.18) (0.26) (-0.52) (-0.17) (-1.81) (-1.02) 
Dummy 1999 -2.46 -11.04 -23.89 -30.31 -42.2 -52.52 
(-0.14) (-0.54) (-1.01) (-1.31) (-1.52) (-1.27) 
Dummy 2000 28.79 7.65 6.11 0.73 -33.65 -20.95 
(1.51) (0.37) (0.26) (0.03) (-1.21) (-0.51) 
Dummy 2001 -2.69 -1.99 -7.4 -8.47 -21.8 11.36 
(-0.17) (-0.1) (-0.33) (-0.39) (-0.83) (0.29) 
Dummy 2002 -5.49 1.04 -4.88 -6.33 -9.44 3.8 
(-0.32) (0.05) (-0.21) (-0.27) (-0.34) (0.09) 
Number of observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 
0.401 0.126 0.259 0.315 0.625 0.699 
Adjusted ^ -0.139 -0.054 ^ 0.536 
Dummy 1995 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 1995 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 1996 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 1996 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 1997 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 
1997 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 1999 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 1999 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 
2000 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 2000 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 2001 is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a spinoff was listed in 2001 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 2002 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 2002 
and 0 otherwise, t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 8: Regression of long-run buy-and-hold return (Vo): spinoffs 
Variable 1-year return 2-year return 3-year return 
Intercept -8.74 5.83 135.92 
(-0.13) (0.08) (3.86) 
Dummy 1995 50.96 49.73 -154.07 
(0.52) (0.46) (-3.09) 
Dummy 1996 2.19 -51.61 -191.18 
(0.03) (-0.64) (-5.12) 
Dummy 1997 -78.12 -86.37 -224.29 
(-0.92) (-0.92) (-5.2) 
Dummy 1999 -64.12 -68.46 -211.24 
(-0.76) (-0.73) (-4.9) 
Dummy 2000 -70.49 -76.42 -219.6 
(-0.83) (-0.82) (-5.09) 
Dummy 2001 74.15 113.96 
(0.93) (1.22) 
Number of observations 19 18 16 
R ^ 0.457 0.506 0.773 
Adjusted R ^ O A ^ ^ 
Dummy 1995 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 1995 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 1996 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 1996 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 1997 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 
1997 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 1999 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 1999 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 
2000 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a spinoff was listed in 2000 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 2001 is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a spinoff was listed in 2001 and 0 otherwise. Dummy 2002 is not included because for those spinoffs listed in 2002, the data 
of 1-year, 2-year and 3-year returns are not available, t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 9: Buy-and-hold returns (%) of holding parent stocks for 1-week, 2-week. 3-week, 4-week, 
3-month, 6-month，l-yean 2-vear and 3-vear periods following the initial trading date of their 
spinoffs 
Spinoffi Parents 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Cheung Kong (Holdings) 0.96 0.96 4.31 8.61 18.18 45.45 44.5 -29.19 31.1 
CK Life Sciences International Cheung Kong (Holdings) -3.17 -1.98 -7.14 -13.1 -19.44 -18.65 
Tom.com Cheung Kong (Holdings) 4,93 -0.99 14.29 15.27 -23.65 1.97 -13.05 -35.96 -51.13 
China Oilfield Services Ltd China National Offshore Oil -4 -4.5 -2.5 3.5 5 6.5 
China Resources Beijing Land China Resources Enterprises -3.14 3.66 16.23 37.7 73.82 127.23 102.62 24.61 6.81 
Guangdong Breweiy Holdings Guangdong Investment -6.88 -8.72 -25.23 -13.76 -55.28 -65.6 -89.91 -87.89 -90.09 
Guangdong Tannery Guangdong Investment 5 24.17 23.33 23.33 17.5 89.17 -13.33 -73.5 -78.5 
Henderson China Henderson Land Development 1.84 1.38 0.92 -1.38 6.45 22.12 18.43 -28.48 -32.35 
Roadshow Kowloon Motor Bus Holdings -0.79 -2.76 -0.79 -1.57 2.36 30.71 66.14 43.7 
Digital China Holdings Legend Group 4.63 -7.41 -5.56 -17.13 -32.87 -34.72 -41.2 -50.46 
Liu Chong Ring Bank Liu Chong Hing Investment 0 0.49 1.46 0.98 -8.78 -35.61 -33.17 -24.39 26.34 
New World China Land New World Development -3.52 -9.69 -13.66 -20.7 -35.02 -34.8 -53.3 -61.01 -73.35 
New World Infrastructure New World Development -2.03 0 2.03 4.73 27.36 17.23 49.66 -7.94 -39.19 
Concord Land Development Pacific Concord Holding -5 -1.5 0 0 -4.5 113.75 -10 -53 -57.5 
Panva Gas Holdings Sinolink Worldwide Holdings -4.84 3.23 0 4.84 19.35 14.52 161.29 64.52 
SUNeVision Holdings Sun Hung Kai Properties -0.36 -4.36 1.82 -10.18 -15.64 -1.45 13.45 -11.64 -38.47 
Road King Infrastructure Wai Kee Holdings -4.28 -11.76 -9.09 -0.53 -8.02 -12.3 0,53 -32.62 -2.14 
i-Cable Communications Wharf (Holdings) -5.81 -2.18 -8.72 -13.8 -35.59 -30.02 -18.64 -18.89 -21.55 
Winsor Properties Holdings Winsor Industrial Corporation 7.56 5.23 6.98 4.65 0 17.44 -5.23 -38.37 -35.47 
Average B&H Returns -1 -0.88 -0.07 0.6 -3.62 13.31 10.52 -24.74 -32.54 
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Table 10: Buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of spinoffs net of the return rate of the 
Hang Seng Index (%) 
1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure -0.86 -4.24 -10.03 -7.63 -7.74 49.64 59.07 38.03 0.78 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 0.41 -5.12 -6.63 -1.73 -6.39 -15.21 -37.38 -60.84 -85.21 
China Oilfield Services Ltd -5.02 1.13 3.78 4.15 10.58 -0.29 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.15 14.42 13.49 5.89 3.98 23.10 12.12 -17.38 -77.64 
CK Life Sciences International -3.16 -2.91 -7.97 -12.57 -25.99 -24.46 
Concord Land Development -1.37 -5.80 -2.31 -7.41 -6.52 71.99 5.95 -29.33 -107.91 
Digital China Holdings 1.27 -6.06 -2.96 -9.98 -32.98 -15.40 -3.83 -20.04 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings -0.03 18.06 -2.36 2.91 -15.69 -21.86 -28.91 -58.38 -93.03 
Guangdong Tannery -8.86 0.61 4.66 3.58 25.14 65.37 -35.33 -65.44 -112.19 
Henderson China -1.18 -1.48 -2.09 -2.87 -22.99 -29.70 -52.06 -78.07 -84.66 
i-Cable Communications -5.20 -17.78 -29.31 -36.89 -49.97 -71.24 -69.97 -41.44 -42.24 
Lai Fung Holdings -11.73 -5.23 -4.11 -2.64 -62.39 -59.78 -88.72 -127.58 -127.15 
Liu Chong Hing Bank -4.57 -7.46 -8.08 -9.91 -12.82 -6.41 -19.09 -16.53 67.84 
New World China Land -1.40 -12.73 -18.51 -27.40 -49.60 -90.13 -103.27 -52.96 -52.68 
New World Infrastructure -0.66 0.38 -3.95 -0.31 -6.92 16.84 13.97 48.43 -23.13 
Panva Gas Holdings -1.72 8.30 8.53 7.39 23.20 36.02 246.17 322.63 
Road King Infrastructure 0.54 -4.24 -7.76 -11.89 -20.15 -31.13 -52.51 -3.42 -45.31 
Roadshow -14.54 -10.01 -21.39 -21.40 -23.99 -11.76 0.40 
SUNeVision Holdings -9.55 -26.59 -30.38 -23.55 -45.82 -54.88 -62.29 -53.61 -46.52 
Tom.com 55.87 45.35 41.24 34.29 -14.76 -28.79 -55.36 -13.16 -28.92 
WiDsor Properties Holdings 17.45 15.92 17.96 23.01 34.86 29.10 4.14 -55.84 -89.29 
Average B&H Returns 0.28 -0.26 -3.25 -4.52 -14.62 -8.05 -14.05 -15.83 -59.20 
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Table 11: Buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of parents net of the return rate of the 
Hang Seng Index (Vo) 
1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 1 0.10 0.28 -0.58 3.35 0.95 14.85 -3.54 -10.53 3.42 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 2 0.80 2.42 9.72 12.14 -13.89 -0.37 4.49 2.49 -5.86 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 3 0.34 -1.32 -3.68 -9.48 -12.10 -11.68 
China National Offshore Oil Corp -3.73 -7.07 -1.37 6.06 10.82 15.73 
China Resources Enterprises -4.22 0.80 11.20 34.95 66.69 119.47 123.38 47.35 0.77 
Guangdong Investment 1 -1.35 -3.62 -9.07 -5.29 -13.93 -30.42 -31.78 -65.90 -95.16 
Guangdong Investment 2 0.49 18.80 17.94 15.50 17.64 77.91 2.43 -53.61 -103.73 
Henderson Land Development 0.18 2.36 2.19 0.68 5.88 13.50 4.04 -33.46 -29.90 
Kowloon Motor Bus Holdings -2.13 -1.45 3.48 4.58 24.79 41.59 83.52 43.70 
Legend Group 1.09 -5.45 -5.31 -15.88 -17.19 -21.24 -26.85 -23.44 
Liu Chong Hing Investment -4.08 -6.00 -7.11 -7.96 -16.75 -17.75 -43.52 -46.75 -41.74 
New World Development 1 -2.69 2.97 5.12 6.27 11.55 6.66 21.41 -15.07 -44.17 
New World Development 2 -0.19 -7.04 -10.87 -13.78 -25.82 -49.78 -84.97 -54.21 -50.29 
Pacific Concord Holding -7.11 -4.36 -4.52 -5.94 -11.76 109.27 10.66 -32.62 -119.23 
Sinolink Worldwide Holdings -5.40 1.06 0.39 1.76 27.43 37.75 176.06 100.52 
Sun Hung Kai Properties -6.50 -2.38 4.05 4.16 -8.98 7.65 36.72 24.32 8.18 
Wai Kee Holdings -2.36 -9.80 -7.88 -2.76 -19.89 -33.09 -38.88 -7.76 -30.90 
Wharf (Holdings) -9.84 -11.33 -12.54 -22.45 -50.27 -22.83 -14.49 5.16 11.11 
Winsor Industrial Corporation 5.43 1.57 1.13 1.73 -5.35 7.92 19.54 -17-75 -45.92 
Average Net B&H Returns -2.17 -1.56 -0.41 0.40 -1.59 13.96 14.01 -7.05 -38.82 
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Table 12; Business classification of spinoffs 
Business Classification Spinoff 
Consolidated Enterprises Digital China Holdings 
Consolidated Enterprises i-Cable Communications 
Consolidated Enterprises Roadshow 
Finance Liu Chong Hing Bank 
GEM CK Life Sciences International 
GEM Panva Gas Holdings 
GEM SUNeVision Holdings 
GEM Tom.com 
Industrials Cheung Kong Infrastructure 
Industrials Chevalier Construction Holdings 
Industrials China Oilfield Services Ltd 
Industrials Guangdong Brewery Holdings 
Industrials Guangdong Tannery 
Industrials New World Infrastructure 
Industrials Road King Infrastructure 
Properties China Resources Beijing Land 
Properties Concord Land Development Co 
Properties Henderson China 
Properties Lai Fung Holdings 
Properties New World China Land 
Properties Winsor Properties Holdings 
The above classifications are according to Hong Kong Exchange 
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Table 13: Buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of spinoffs net of the return rate of the 
corresponding sub-indexes (%) 
Spinoff 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure -0.64 -3.65 -9.23 -6.41 -3.15 55.17 80.23 62.08 29.88 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 2.20 -5.33 -6.78 -1.71 -6.96 -13.77 -29.31 -16.93 -58.97 
China Oilfield Services Ltd -2.21 6.15 7.20 9.80 13.88 7.27 
China Resources Beijing Land -0.47 11.31 9.81 1.86 3.85 28.85 30.14 5.95 -36.52 
Concord Land Development -2.35 -9.19 -6.88 -11.83 -6.80 74.54 23.91 -6.02 -11.27 
Digital China Holdings -1.12 -6.91 -5.29 -12.12 -22.50 -8.04 6.34 -47.06 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 1.19 19.38 0.35 2.32 -12.85 -16.68 -19.70 -48.88 -95.48 
Guangdong Tannery -9.78 -0.21 6.17 7.01 31.54 74.76 -19.21 -47.44 -90.46 
Henderson China -3.45 -3.30 -3.46 -3.81 -27.41 -33.59 -51.95 -47.69 -55.46 
i-Cable Communications -6.83 -18.43 -34.03 -47.32 -85.40 -87.57 -67.09 -30.46 -25.99 
Lai Fung Holdings -8.03 -0.71 1.59 5.40 -52.72 -42.75 -80.38 -88.69 -91.55 
Liu Chong Hing Bank -6.64 -7.73 -8.74 -10.73 -8.99 -15.65 -32.03 -35.95 -17.35 
New World China Land -1.67 -12.07 -16.55 -24.49 -39.36 -81.31 -71.33 -56.25 -57.15 
New World Infrastructure -1.58 -0.13 -3.75 0.13 -9.30 11.22 17.95 61.36 -5.30 
Road King Infrastructure 0.10 -4.32 -7.66 -10.99 -16.68 -26.35 -37.28 17.87 -16.72 
Roadshow -14.84 -9.50 -18.01 -18.29 -13.87 -2.70 12.33 
Winsor Properties Holdings 15.95 11.04 13.28 19.10 36.51 36.20 22.18 -32.90 -44.07 
Average Net B&H Returns -2.36 -1.98 -4.82 -6.01 -12.95 -2.38 -13.45 -14.07 -34.86 
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Table 14; Business classification of parents 
Business Classification Parent 
Consolidated Enterprises China Resources Enterprises 
Consolidated Enterprises Guangdong Investment 
Consolidated Enterprises Liu Chong Hing Investment 
Consolidated Enterprises Pacific Concord Holding 
Consolidated Enterprises Wharf (Holdings) 
Industrials China National Offshore Oil Corp 
Industrials Legend Group 
Industrials Wai Kee Holdings 
Industrials Winsor Industrial Corporation 
Properties Cheung Kong (Holdings) 
Properties Henderson Land Development 
Properties New World Development 
Properties Sinolink Worldwide Holdings 
Properties Sun Hung Kai Properties 
Utilities Kowloon Motor Bus Holdings 
The above classifications are according to Hong Kong Exchange 
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Table 15; Buy-and-hold returns of holding the shares of parents net of the return rate of the 
corresponding sub-indexes (%) 
Parent 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 1 0.41 0.79 0.42 2.72 -0.52 10.46 20.46 23.41 45.64 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 2 -0.82 -0.63 8.81 6.42 -4.07 -10.65 -22.44 -15.02 -14.55 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) 3 -0.46 -1.34 -0.49 -2.01 -2.76 -1.20 
China National Offshore Oil Corp -0.92 -2.05 2.05 11.71 14.12 23.29 
China Resources Enterprises -5.16 -2.12 8.88 33.82 67.30 120.47 124.88 69.57 27.21 
Guangdong Investment 1 -1.18 -6.37 -8.87 -8.95 -9.92 -17.67 -18.66 -43.84 -76.46 
Guangdong Investment 2 0.70 18.64 18.96 18.38 18.86 80.59 16.61 -27.56 -70.85 
Henderson Land Development -2.09 0.54 0.82 -0.26 1.46 9.61 4.15 -3.08 -0.70 
Kowloon Motor Bus Holdings -0.31 -4.72 0.26 -0.54 4.60 34.55 63.62 43.70 
Legend Group -0.97 -6.15 -7.42 -17.65 -5.61 -12.48 -15.75 -8.77 
Liu Chong Hing Investment -3.11 -5.57 -6.13 -6.94 -12.39 -11.16 -31.51 -37.68 -19.85 
New World Development! -2.09 3.86 5.57 6.09 4.41 -2.97 10.76 -1.25 -19.06 
New World Development 2 -0.46 -6.38 -8.91 -10.87 -15.58 -40.96 -53.03 -57.50 -54.76 
Pacific Concord Holding -7.02 -6.73 -6.05 -7.35 -11.10 107.51 12.20 -9.70 -37.16 
Sinolink Worldwide Holdings -4.79 0.23 -1.98 -1.69 23.50 39.58 169.63 112.04 
Sun Hung Kai Properties -5.71 -5.78 0.75 0.65 -2.85 1.28 10.40 5.51 1.08 
Wai Kee Holdings -2.80 -9.88 -7.78 -1.86 -16.42 -28.31 -23.65 13.53 -2.31 
Wharf (Holdings) -11.47 -11.98 -17.26 -32.88 -85.70 -39.16 -11.61 16.14 27.36 
Winsor Industrial Corporation 3.47 -1.21 -1.66 -0.17 -3.42 13.87 28.22 -4.74 -25.09 
Average Net B&H Returns -2.36 -2.47 -1.05 -0.60 -1.90 14.56 16.72 6.22 -15.68 
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Table 17: Dividends Per Share of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 1.27 1.39 1.43 1.47 1.52 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 0.13 0.10 -0.05 -0.50 0.03 -0.12 0.03 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.05 
CK Life Sciences International -0.02 
Digital China Holdings 0.20 0.21 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 
Guangdong Tannery 0.10 -0.03 -0.12 -0.16 -0.14 -0.39 
Henderson China 6.46 1.60 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.27 
i-Cable Communications -0.24 0.01 0.08 0.06 
Lai Fung Holdings 0.20 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 
Liu Chong King Bank 1.06 1.15 1.39 1.52 0.78 0.82 1.05 
New World China Land 0.14 0.14 0.09 
New World Infrastructure 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.00 -0.04 
Panva Gas Holdings 0.06 0.22 
Road King Infrastructure 0.45 0.72 0.84 1.14 0.84 0.40 0.55 
Roadshow 0.21 0.06 
SUNeVision Holdings -0.03 -0.08 -0.31 
Tom-com -0.15 -0.20 -0.12 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.44 -1.19 0.05 0.20 0.35 
Average EPS 0.55 0.25 0.26 0.36 0.37 0.16 0.37 
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Table 17: Dividends Per Share of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 0.38 0.42 0.60 0.63 0.68 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
CK Life Sciences International 0.00 
Digital China Holdings 0.07 0.07 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Guangdong Tannery 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Henderson China 0.15 0.58 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.12 
i-Cable Communications 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 
Lai Fung Holdings 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Liu Chong Hing Bank 0.27 0.50 0.63 0.69 0.40 0.42 0.53 
New World China Land 0.00 0.00 0.02 
New World Infrastructure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Panva Gas Holdings 0.00 0.00 
Road King Infrastructure 0.10 0.17 0.31 0.32 0.41 0.09 0.24 
Roadshow 0.04 0.02 
SUNeVision Holdings 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tom.com 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Average Dividends Per Share 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.18 
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Table 18: Market to Book Value of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 1.92 1.52 1.21 1.02 1.04 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 1.00 0.76 0.61 0.33 0.80 0.76 0.40 
China Oilfield Services Ltd 0.47 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.83 0.37 0.66 0.59 0.30 
CK Life Sciences International 3.21 
Digital China Holdings 2.88 1.46 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 1.44 0.56 0.44 0.31 0.57 0.52 
Guangdong Tannery 0.82 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.32 0.31 
Henderson China 1.64 0.84 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.22 
i-Cable Communications 10.20 5.15 6.63 3.44 
Lai Fung Holdings 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.10 0.07 
Liu Chong Hing Bank 0.95 0.90 1.14 0.93 0.84 0.67 0.71 
New World China Land 0.20 0.32 0.17 
New World Infrastructure 1.74 2.20 0.89 1.18 0.48 0.41 0.14 
Panva Gas Holdings 5.91 6.20 
Road King Infrastructure 1.54 1.35 0.84 0.63 0.43 0.36 0.42 
Roadshow 2.33 1.42 
SUNeVision Holdings 3.13 0.91 0.91 
Tom-com 8.43 21.65 22.69 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.29 0.12 0.22 0.30 0.34 
Average Market to Book Value 2.45 2.57 2.46 0.78 0.50 0.47 0.38 
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Table 19: Total Sales of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 3291000 3063000 2567000 2316000 1872000 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 1372511 2415011 3052506 2579913 2390937 1226463 526927 
China Oilfield Services Ltd 1935179 
CK Life Sciences International 4948 
Digita丨 China Ho丨dings 10521023 12510754 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 253223 618641 682454 613892 543922 593052 
Guangdong Tannery 830149 845980 594994 721141 764929 529055 
i-Cab丨e Communications 1345546 1649401 1930999 2160788 
New World Infrastructure 160640 368032 896316 976710 588366 664440 676138 
Panva Gas Holdings 1008335 1150322 
Road King Infrastructure 181190 303301 243150 275774 245501 163740 
Roadshow 288823 155054 
SUNeVision Holdings 62594 178840 223300 
Tom.com 89223 626624 1624126 
Average Total Sales 1524599 1990413 1312761 1377745 1067609 635350 601533 
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Table 17: Dividends Per Share of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 1.46 1.36 1.14 1.03 0.83 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 5.99 10.55 13.33 16.52 10.44 5.17 2.12 
China Oilfield Services Ltd 0.00 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.00 0.30 1.09 2.28 0.75 
CK Life Sciences International 0.00 
Digital China Holdings 12.50 14.57 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 0.64 0.49 0.55 0.49 0.44 0.47 
Guangdong Tannery 1.71 1.61 1.14 1.38 1.46 1.01 
Henderson China 14.95 3.95 0.61 0.70 0.72 0.97 1.16 
i-Cable Communications 0.82 0.82 0.96 1.07 
Lai Fung Holdings 0.99 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.04 
New World China Land 0.41 0.40 0.63 
New World Infrastructure 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.17 
Panva Gas Holdings 1.78 1.91 
Road King Infrastructure 0.45 0.56 0.46 0.54 0.49 0.32 
Roadshow 0.35 0.16 
SUNeVision Holdings 0.03 0.09 0.11 
Toin.com 0.03 0.19 0.49 
Winsor Properties Holdings 1.10 1.15 1.17 1.48 0.81 
Average Sales Per Share 2.28 2.25 1.58 2.35 1.61 1.35 1.15 
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Table 21: Price/Earnings Ratio of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 13.62 10.79 8.95 8.27 8.78 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 4.92 5.70 -8.30 -0.23 9.67 -1.58 3.67 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.00 8.90 27.17 13.91 16.00 
CK Life Sciences International -70.00 
Digital China Holdings 21.50 11.19 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 8.46 9.14 9.50 26.50 17.00 8.08 
Guangdong Tannery 8.90 -8.67 -1.86 -1.13 -1.47 -0.46 
Henderson China 2.63 8.16 12.60 14.64 13.45 10.96 12.22 
i-Cable Communications -43.96 330.00 59.38 42.92 
Lai Fung Holdings 1.85 122.00 44.50 -2.57 -3.23 
Liu Chong Hing Bank 8.49 8.00 9.28 7.43 12.69 9.94 8.62 
New World China Land 16.43 27.14 23.33 
New World Infrastructure 137.92 128.82 44.50 66.36 22.26 -43.75 
Panva Gas Holdings 25.83 12.50 
Road King Infrastructure 9.86 6.79 4.12 4.17 7.69 6.50 
Roadshow 9.76 20.50 
SUNeVision Holdings -208.33 -21.63 -4.65 
Toin.com -13.33 -19.13 -15.50 
Winsor Properties Holdings 14.89 -1.64 38.60 13.00 7.71 
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Table 22; Return on Equity of Spinoffs (%) 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 14.04 14.15 13.46 12.29 11.85 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 19.93 13.97 -7.87 -99.96 9.09 -44.56 9.93 
China Resources Beijing Land 9.79 4.70 3.67 3.61 0.66 
CK Life Sciences International -3.19 
Digital China Holdings 15.22 13.10 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 6.43 8.10 4.44 0.85 3.34 7.28 
Guangdong Tannery 8.84 -2.96 -13.82 -27.71 -21.85 -71.95 
Henderson China 17.90 9.09 1.69 1.81 2.04 2.63 1.78 
i-Cable Communications -18.59 1.56 11.60 7.76 
Lai Fung Holdings 3.49 -1.11 -0.65 -2.87 -1.66 
Liu Chong Hing Bank 9.76 11.31 12.37 11.58 6.66 6.77 8.19 
New World China Land 1.23 1.16 0.63 
New World Infrastructure 6.07 7.80 10.92 9.03 10.69 0.67 -1.19 
Panva Gas Holdings 52.23 63.25 
Road King Infrastructure 10.22 13.25 15.55 10.27 5.62 7.19 
Roadshow 21.39 7.36 
SUNeVision Holdings -114 -4.59 -19.67 
Toin.com -56.75 -108.58 -139.94 
Winsor Properties Holdings 2.47 -8.51 0.83 2.52 4.96 
Average Return on Equity 6.28 2.39 -7.12 -5.90 2.85 -13.14 4.68 
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Table 23: Return on Asset of Spinoffs (%) 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 11.43 11.35 8.79 9.08 8.07 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 4.29 2.66 -1.22 -7.37 0.67 -2.69 0.93 
China Resources Beijing Land 4.66 2.30 1.68 1.83 0.32 
CK Life Sciences International -3.16 
Digital China Holdings 6.62 4.64 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 3.26 4.35 2.57 0.57 2.72 5.95 
Guangdong Tannery 5.18 -1.72 -7.41 -15.67 -13.56 -42.46 
Henderson China 8.03 6.65 1.11 1.22 1.36 1.69 1.18 
i-Cable Communications -7.96 0.49 3.94 3.76 
Lai Fung Holdings 2.41 -0.73 -0.44 -2.27 -1.31 
Liu Chong Hing Bank 1.95 2.11 2.04 1.92 1.06 1.00 1.17 
New World China Land 0.95 0.88 0.45 
New World Infrastructure 4.20 4.94 5.47 4.43 4.77 0.26 -0.52 
Panva Gas Holdings 12.93 23.08 
Road King Infrastructure 5.94 8.81 10.79 7.47 4.28 5.57 
Roadshow 20.32 6.09 
SUNeVision Holdings -0.92 -3.67 -15.47 
Toin.com -27.68 -37.70 -14.92 
Winsor Properties Holdings 1.67 -4.55 0.51 1.66 3.33 
Average Return on Asset 2.85 1.67 -0.14 0.55 1.07 -4.39 0.69 
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Table 24: Quality of Income of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.35 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 0.45 -0.79 1.07 -2.23 6.14 3.69 9.73 
CK Life Sciences International 1.23 
Digital China Holdings 1.78 1.42 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 0.93 2.80 5.86 27.89 5.64 2.47 
Guangdong Tannery -0.47 -2.25 -0.36 -0.56 -0.24 0.04 
i-Cable Communications -1.26 31.14 4.73 7.77 
New World Infrastructure 0.31 0.27 0.40 0.68 0.02 -15.13 3.90 
Panva Gas Holdings -0.33 0.35 
Road King Infrastructure 0.26 0.22 0.16 -0.17 0.16 0.21 
Roadshow 0.26 0.52 
SUNeVision Holdings -0.68 1.40 0.17 
Toin.coin 0.76 0.58 0.20 
Average Quality of Income 0.27 2.99 1.37 4.78 2.01 -1.74 6.82 
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Table 28: Current Ratio of Spinoffs (2) 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 1.09 1.14 0.40 0.86 2.45 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.08 
China Oilfield Services Ltd 4.36 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.97 0.57 0.42 0.48 0.57 
CK Life Sciences International 11.91 
Digital China Holdings 0.30 0.30 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.58 1.18 
Guangdong Tannery 0.22 0.55 0.45 0.79 0.77 0.36 
Henderson China 1.71 0.30 0.41 0.12 0.28 0.16 0.41 
i-Cable Communications 1.99 1.76 1.41 0.00 
Lai Fung Holdings 0.22 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.27 
New World China Land 0.36 0.54 0.58 
New World Infrastructure 3.51 1.78 0.81 0.67 1.07 0.66 0.39 
Panva Gas Holdings 1.22 0.65 
Road King Infrastructure 1.07 2.28 1.92 0.91 5.30 4.45 
Roadshow 14.93 3.92 
SUNeVision Holdings 12.07 8.91 0.88 
Toin.com 1.13 0.26 0.30 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09 
Average Cash Ratio 3.04 1.42 0.61 0.45 1.14 1.14 0.30 
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Table 28: Current Ratio of Spinoffs (2) 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 1.09 1.14 0.40 0.86 2.45 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.08 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.97 0.57 0.42 0.48 0.57 
Digital China Holdings 0.30 0.30 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.58 1.18 
Guangdong Tannery 0.22 0.55 0.45 0.79 0.77 0.36 
Henderson China 1.71 0.30 0.41 0.12 0.28 0.16 0.41 
i-Cable Communications 1.99 1.76 1.41 0.00 
Lai Fung Holdings 0.22 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.27 
New World China Land 0.36 0.54 0.58 
New World Infrastructure 3.51 1.78 0.81 0.67 1.07 0.66 0.39 
Panva Gas Holdings 1.22 0.65 
Road King Infrastructure 1.07 2.28 1.92 0.91 5.30 4.45 
Roadshow 14.93 3.92 
SUNeVision Holdings 12.07 8.91 0.88 
Tom.com 1.13 0.26 0.30 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09 
Average Cash Ratio 2.44 1.42 0.61 0.45 1.14 1.14 0.30 
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Table 28: Current Ratio of Spinoffs (2) 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 2.23 2.51 0.74 1.10 2.76 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 1.18 1.18 1.14 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.06 
China Oilfield Services Ltd 5.71 
China Resources Beijing Land 3.85 3.37 2.47 2.14 4.18 
CK Life Sciences International 14.03 
Digital China Holdings 1.76 1.60 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.18 1.51 1.88 
Guangdong Tannery 1.88 2.84 1.55 2.36 2.46 1.66 
Henderson China 4.61 2.83 1.80 2.22 2.25 2.83 2.62 
i-Cable Communications 2.16 1.97 1.62 0.44 
Lai Fung Holdings 1.01 0.51 0.71 0.59 0.49 
New World China Land 1.44 1.87 1.91 
New World Infrastructure 3.57 1.82 0.90 0.78 1.28 0.92 0.96 
Panva Gas Holdings 2.55 2.36 
Road King Infrastructure 1.73 3.29 3.13 3.68 8.42 5.64 
Roadshow 20.95 4.80 
SUNeVision Holdings 12.46 9.38 1 02 
Tom-com 1.26 0.95 0.97 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.09 0.48 0.69 0.54 0.59 
Average Current Ratio 4.40 2.52 1.41 1.46 2.50 2.33 1-55 
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Table 28: Current Ratio of Spinoffs (2) 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 2.23 2.51 0.74 1.10 2.76 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 1.18 1.18 1.14 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.06 
China Resources Beijing Land 3.85 3.37 2.47 2.14 4.18 
Digital China Holdings 1.76 1.60 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.18 1.51 1.88 
Guangdong Tannery 1.88 2.84 1.55 2.36 2.46 1.66 
Henderson China 4.61 2.83 1.80 2.22 2.25 2.83 2.62 
i-Cable Communications 2.16 1.97 1.62 0.44 
Lai Fung Holdings 1.01 0.51 0.71 0.59 0.49 
New World China Land 1.44 1.87 1.91 
New World Infrastructure 3.57 1.82 0.90 0.78 1.28 0.92 0.96 
Panva Gas Holdings 2.55 2.36 
Road King Infrastructure 1.73 3.29 3.13 3.68 8.42 5.64 
Roadshow 20.95 4.80 
SUNeVision Holdings 12.46 9.38 1.02 
Tom.com 1.26 0.95 0.97 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.09 0.48 0.69 0.54 0.59 
Average Current Ratio 3.75 2.52 1.41 1.46 2.50 2.33 1.55 
77 
Table 29: Debt-to-Equitv Ratio of Spinoffs 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 6th year 7th year 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 0.15 0.18 0.44 0.31 0.44 
Chevalier Construction Holdings 0.73 0.79 0.93 0.68 0.01 0.52 0.00 
China Oilfield Services Ltd 0.00 
China Resources Beijing Land 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.46 0.53 
CK Life Sciences International 0.00 
Digital China Holdings 0.30 0.55 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings 0.81 0.71 0.56 0.31 0.00 0.00 
Guangdong Tannery 0.18 0.34 0.57 0.55 0.45 0.23 
Henderson China 0.83 0.08 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.24 
i-Cable Communications 0.87 1.40 1.25 0.45 
Lai Fung Holdings 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.17 0.18 
New World China Land 0.23 0.24 0.33 
New World Infrastructure 0.19 0.35 0.75 0.73 0.92 1.28 1.29 
Panva Gas Holdings 0.79 0.43 
Road King Infrastructure 0.65 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.26 
Roadshow 0.00 0.15 
SUNeVision Holdings 0.18 0.19 0.23 
Tom.com 0.00 0.28 3.20 
Winsor Properties Holdings 0.41 0.76 0.58 0.46 0.44 
Average Debt-to-Equity Ratio 0.37 0.46 0.74 0.42 0.35 0.43 0.51 
78 
Bibliography 
Allen, J.W., 2001. Private information and spin-off performance. Journal of Business, 
74(2)，281-306. 
Aron, D., 1991. Using the capital market as a monitor: corporate spin-offs in an 
agency framework. Rand Journal of Economics 22，505-518. 
Bates, T.，Coughenour, J.R, Shastri, K.，1999. Spinoffs, spreads, and information 
asymmetry, working paper, University of Western Ontario, University of 
Delaware and University of Pittsburgh. 
Boot, A., Thakor, A” 1993. Security design. Journal of Finance 48, 1349-1378. 
Cusatis, RJ.，Miles, J.A., Woolridge, J.R.，1993. Restructuring through Spinoffs: the 
stock market evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 293-311. 
Daley, L.，Mehrotra, V., Sivakumar, R.，1997. Corporate focus and value creation: 
evidence from spin-offs. Journal of Financial Economics 45, 257-281. 
Desai, H., Jain, RC., 1999. Firm performance and focus: long-run stock market 
performance following spinoffs. Journal of Financial Economics 54, 75-101. 
Dittmar，A., 2004. Capital structure in corporate spin-offs. Journal of Business 77, 
9-44. 
Gilson, S., Healy, R, Noe, C., Palepu, K., 1998. Corporate focus and the benefits 
from more specialized analyst coverage. Unpublished Working paper. 
Harvard University, Cambridge. 
Hite, G.，Owers, J., 1983. Security price reactions around corporate spin-off 
announcements. Journal of Financial Economics 12, 409-436. 
Huson, M.R., MacKinnon, G.，2003. Corporate spinoffs and information asymmetry 
between investors. Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 481-503. 
Krishnaswami, S., Subramaniam, V.，1999. Information asymmetry, valuation, and 
the corporate spin-off decision. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 73-112. 
79 
McConnell, J.J., Ozbilgin, M.，Wahal, S., 2001. Spin-offs, ex ante. Journal of 
Business 74(2), 245-280. 
Miles, J., Wooldridge J., 1999. Spin-offs and equity carve-outs. Financial Executives 
Research Foundation, Inc. 
Miles, J., Rosenfeld, J., 1983. The effect of voluntary spin-off announcements on 
shareholder wealth. Journal of Finance 38, 1597-1606. 
Schipper, K.，Smith, A., 1983. Effects of recontracting on shareholder wealth: the 
case of voluntary spin-offs. Journal of Financial Economics 12, 437-467. 
Seward, J., Walsh, J., 1996. The governance and control of voluntary corporate 
spin-offs. Strategic Management Journal 17, 25-40. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance, 52(2), 737-783. 
Slovin, M.B., Sushka, M.E.，Ferrarp, S.R., 1995. A comparison of the information 
conveyed by equity carve-outs, spin-offs and asset sell-offs. Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 89-104. 
Veld, C., Veld-Merkoulova, Y.V.，2004. Do spin-offs really create value? The 
European case. Journal of Banking & Finance 28, 1111-1135. 
80 
”? £识祭?•广》 







inMum saLjejqn >IHnD _ 
